A Draft of a Treaty, with Annotations

Article XI: Dispute Resolution

1. Any Party (“Concerned Party”) may raise concerns regarding the implementation of this treaty, including concerns about ambiguous situations or possible non-compliance by another Party (“Requested Party”). This includes misuse of Protective Actions (Article XII).

   1. The Concerned Party shall notify the Requested Party of their concern, while also sharing their concern with the Director-General and Executive Council. The Requested Party will acknowledge this notification within 36 hours, and provide clarification within 5 days.

2. If the issue is not resolved, the Concerned Party may request that the Executive Council assist in adjudicating and clarifying the concern. This may include the Concerned Party requesting a challenge inspection in accordance with Article X.

   1. The Executive Council shall provide appropriate information in its possession relevant to such a concern.
   2. The Executive Council may task the Technical Secretariat to compile additional documentation, convene closed technical sessions, and recommend resolution measures.

3. If the Executive Council determines there was a Treaty violation, it can take actions to prevent dangerous AI activities or reprimand the Requested Party. These actions may include:

   1. Require additional monitoring or restrictions on AI activities
   2. Require relinquishment of AI hardware
   3. Call for sanctions
   4. Recommend Parties take Protective Actions under Article XII

Precedent

Our Article XI Dispute Resolution procedures borrow from Articles IX, XII, and XIV of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Article IX of the CWC requires signatories to respond to requests for clarification “as soon as possible, but in any case not later than 10 days after the request.” Given how quickly digital developments can propagate, we chose a 5-day response deadline, but even this figure may need to be adjusted downward.

Our Paragraph 2 of this article is modeled after Article XIV of the CWC, which permits its Executive Council to “contribute to the settlement of a dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States Parties to a dispute to start the settlement process of their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.” Parties are also encouraged to refer cases to the International Court of Justice as appropriate.

As in Paragraph 3 of our Article XI, the CWC’s Article XII empowers the Executive Council to recommend remedies, including sanctions, “in cases where serious damage to the object and purpose of this Convention may result from activities prohibited under this Convention.” To give force to those recommendations, the CWC’s Council is to “bring the issue, including relevant information and conclusions, to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council.” Recommendations by our treaty’s ISIA Executive Council may be similarly escalated.

Notes

The purpose of Article XI is to include a consultation and clarification process to resolve issues that arise between signatories.

Given the pace of AI innovation, determining violations on a reasonable timeline can be challenging. The role of the Executive Council is to adjudicate any concerns raised by any party to the treaty. The Technical Secretariat has the role of ensuring that the inspections are conducted by experts that have an understanding of cutting-edge AI technologies. The treaty uses an aggressive timeline (measured in hours and days) in the hopes that it is fast enough for parties to wait for rulings before taking Protective Actions (as described in Article XII, below), even despite the rapid pace of technological change in the field of AI. That said, of course no treaty can prevent a party from taking protective actions that they deem necessary to ensure their own security.